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Abstract
Background: The cost of maternity care can be a barrier to access that may increase maternal and neonatal
mortality risk. We analyzed spending on maternity care in urban slum communities in Mumbai to better
understand the equity of spending and the impact of spending on household poverty.
Methods: We used expenditure data for maternal and neonatal care, collected during post-partum interviews.
Interviews were conducted in 2005-2006, with a sample of 1200 slum residents in Mumbai (India). We analysed
expenditure by socio-economic status (SES), calculating a Kakwani Index for a range of spending categories. We
also calculated catastrophic health spending both with and without adjustment for coping strategies. This
identified the level of catastrophic payments incurred by a household and the prevalence of catastrophic
payments in this population. The analysis also gave an understanding of the protection from medical poverty
afforded by coping strategies (for example saving and borrowing).
Results: A high proportion of respondents spent catastrophically on care. Lower SES was associated with a higher
proportion of informal payments. Indirect health expenditure was found to be (weakly) regressive as the poorest
were more likely to use wage income to meet health expenses, while the less poor were more likely to use
savings. Overall, the incidence of catastrophic maternity expenditure was 41%, or 15% when controlling for coping
strategies. We found no significant difference in the incidence of catastrophic spending across wealth quintiles, nor
could we conclude that total expenditure is regressive.
Conclusions: High expenditure as a proportion of household resources should alert policymakers to the burden of
maternal spending in this context. Differences in informal payments, significantly regressive indirect spending and
the use of savings versus wages to finance spending, all highlight the heavier burden borne by the most poor. If a
policy objective is to increase institutional deliveries without forcing households deeper into poverty, these
inequities will need to be addressed. Reducing out-of-pocket payments and better regulating informal payments
should have direct benefits for the most poor. Alternatively, targeted schemes aimed at assisting the most poor in
coping with maternal spending (including indirect spending) could reduce the household impact of high costs.
Background
There have been numerous calls to improve neonatal
survival and maternal health outcomes by stimulating
demand for appropriate services [1-3]. Within this lit-
erature, the cost of care as a barrier to access has been
frequently highlighted [4-6]. Similarly, the relationship
between health spending and poverty has been discussed
by Wagstaff [7], Van Doorslaer et al [8] and Whitehead
et al [9,10], among others.
India accounts for more than 25% of maternal deaths
globally [11]. The majority of studies on maternal health
spending and service use in India have been conducted
either at the macro-level (State or National) [6,12,13], or
have had a predominantly rural focus (see for example
[14]). Given that out of pocket payment is the principal
method of financing health care throughout Asia [15],
that over 72% of expenditure in India is financed out of
pocket [13,16], and that Navaneetham et al [12] high-
light significant difference in maternal care use between
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Indian States, there is a strong case for more focussed
study of vulnerable populations.
Mumbai is India’s most populous city, with more than
16 million people spanning multiple ethnic, cultural and
linguistic groups. More than half of Mumbai’s popula-
tion currently live in slums [17], and families in these
relatively deprived areas constitute the focus of this
paper. Although no directly comparable study has yet
been conducted within Mumbai’s slum-dwelling popula-
tion, a related study by Shah More et al [18] provides a
comprehensive overview of maternal care seeking prac-
tices in Mumbai, with a focus on the poor. The authors
describe high levels of antenatal care use (93%) and
institutional delivery (90%), with antenatal care evenly
split between public and private providers and delivery
care slightly skewed towards the public sector. They
describe the complexity of service choice in the Mumbai
context and raise concerns about referral practices and
the quality of care in both the public and private sectors
[18]. By comparison, Griffiths and Stephenson con-
ducted a qualitative study of care seeking in Mumbai
and Pune [19]. They found that women perceived pri-
vate services to be superior to government services, and
poor perceptions of government care motivated home
deliveries if women could not afford private care [19].
Within the context of calls to stimulate demand for
care, poorer households may find it difficult to plan for
and meet the costs of maternity care in a pluralistic
health system. Inability to meet the cost of maternity
care can act as a significant barrier to service access and
may be a determinant of maternal and neonatal morbid-
ity and mortality. Among those who do use services,
health spending that constitutes a significant portion of
household resources may also reduce other consump-
tion, including spending on food and education, and
may have both immediate and intergenerational effects
on household poverty and the equity of health service
delivery [7].
Health spending is generally considered ‘catastrophic’
when a household must reduce its basic expenditure to
cope with health costs. This is assumed to happen when
health expenditure exceeds a proportion (usually 40%)
of total household income or expenditure, thus ‘crowd-
ing out’ other spending. Using a proportional measure
such as this (health spending as a percentage of total
spending), economists can approximate the welfare
effects of medical expenditures [4,15,20-22]. Xu et al.
[20] used data from 59 countries to explore variables
associated with catastrophic health expenditure. They
defined health expenditure as catastrophic if it exceeded
40% of income remaining after subsistence needs were
met, and identified three key preconditions for cata-
strophic payments, all of which hold in the context of
our study: availability of health services requiring
payment, low capacity to pay, and a lack of prepaid
health insurance. Su et al. [4] quantified the extent of
catastrophic health spending and determined the risk
factors in Nouna District, Burkina Faso. They used dif-
ferent thresholds of catastrophic health expenditure and
found that even expenditure in the region of 6-15% of
total income had catastrophic consequences. The key
determinants of catastrophic expenditure were low eco-
nomic status, modern medical care use (usually use of
private services), illness episodes and a household mem-
ber with chronic illness. A study in Thailand compared
the incidence of catastrophic expenditures (>10% of
total consumption, including food and non-food expen-
diture), before and after the introduction of universal
health care coverage [22]. Households using private
inpatient services were more likely to face catastrophic
expenditure. Finally, van Doorslaer et al. [15] estimated
the magnitude and distribution of catastrophic expendi-
ture in 14 countries and territories, accounting for 81%
of the Asian population. They found that countries rely-
ing most heavily on out-of-pocket (OOP) financing had
the highest incidence of catastrophic payments.
In short, the literature consistently argues that out-of-
pocket medical expenditure increases the risk of cata-
strophic spending and medical poverty. However, Flores
et al. [23] argue that this definition of catastrophic
spending is insensitive to how spending is financed
through coping strategies. They provide an extensive
review of the literature on coping with health payments,
and consider not only the extent of health spending but
also the strategies through which it is financed. Using
nationally representative data from India, they found
that coping strategies financed up to 75% of inpatient
care. Capacity to draw on savings, assets, credit and
transfers from friends and relatives may thus have pro-
tected the consumption of other goods, at least in the
short term. They suggest that ignoring coping strategies
may overstate the risk to short-run consumption, exag-
gerate the short-run scale of catastrophic payments, and
potentially understate the long-run burden of health
payments that may include significant debt financing.
Aside from measuring the impoverishing effect of
health spending, the incidence of catastrophic payments
is also an indicator of equity in health service provision.
For example, Xu et al. [21] investigated whether the
abolition of user fees levied at government health facil-
ities in Uganda increased access for the poor and
reduced the risk of catastrophic health expenditure.
They defined expenditure as catastrophic if it exceeded
40% of income remaining after subsistence needs were
met and found that utilization among the poor
increased after the abolition of fees. Unexpectedly, how-
ever, the incidence of catastrophic spending among the
poor did not fall. The authors argue that the most likely
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explanation was that frequent unavailability of drugs at
government facilities after 2001 forced patients to pur-
chase from private pharmacies. Moreover, informal pay-
ments may have risen to offset lost revenue from formal
fees. This finding points to the importance of measuring
both formal and informal health expenditures.
In addition to the formal and informal constituents,
the price of health services usually incorporates both a
direct and indirect cost. McIntyre et al. [24] and Russell
[25] provide detailed overviews of health expenditure
studies, identifying direct and indirect costs commonly
used to quantify the economic consequences of ill
health. Examples of direct medical costs commonly
include scheduled user fees (or the price of traditional
or private care), drug costs, informal payments and pay-
ment for diagnostic tests [26-29]. Indirect costs gener-
ally cover productivity losses and the opportunity cost
of care seeking, including travel and waiting times
[30-33].
While analysing spending can highlight the drivers of
medical poverty and inequitable care, the literature on
health equity is also concerned with the progressiveness
of financing. The progressiveness of a financing system
refers to “the extent to which payments for health care
rise or fall as a proportion of a person’s income as
income rises. A progressive system is one in which
health care payments rise as a proportion of income as
income rises, whilst a regressive system is one in which
payments fall as a proportion of income as income
rises” [34]. There are different ways to capture progres-
siveness in health financing. The most direct is to exam-
ine health spending as a share of ability to pay. For
example, a study from Sierra Leone showed that the
rural poor can be disproportionately disadvantaged by
user charges for health care, spending a higher percen-
tage of their incomes on health care than wealthier
households [35]. By comparison, Roy and Howard [36]
examined how well the Indian healthcare system pro-
tected households of differing living standards against
the financial consequences of health shocks. They found
that OOP payments increase with ability to pay. They
suggested two explanations for this observed relation-
ship: firstly, a lack of insurance requiring the better-off
to pay more to secure higher quality care, and secondly,
the poor may limit expenditure more stringently and
possibly forego care altogether. In this literature there is
a gap in recent evidence as it relates to the urban poor
in low and middle income settings.
In summary, equitable healthcare and the reduction of
medical poverty are key goals of health systems and
financing reform. In this paper, we analyzed direct and
indirect expenditure on private and public maternity
care in urban slum communities in Mumbai. The first
objective was to understand what proportion of
household spending was allocated to maternal health
expenditure, and how this proportion varied by socioe-
conomic status (SES) as a measure of the progressive-
ness of payments. The second objective was to analyze
the sources of finance (coping strategies) used to meet
this expenditure. Finally, we analysed the relative impact
of maternal health expenditure on current consumption,
to estimate the incidence of catastrophic payments.
Methods
Data Collection
We used data on delivery care expenditures, sources of
finance and socioeconomic characteristics, collected by
the Society for Nutrition, Education and Health Action
(SNEHA) as part of the City Initiative for Newborn
Health. The City Initiative for Newborn Health is a col-
laboration of SNEHA, the Municipal Corporation of
Greater Mumbai, the ICICI Centre for Child Health and
Nutrition, and the UCL Centre for International Health
and Development. Interviews were conducted between
2005 and 2006. The sample consisted of 1204 post-
partum women living in 48 Mumbai slum communities.
The study was conducted in 6 municipal wards, which
defined the population for a larger cross-sectoral initia-
tive [17,37]. Data collection and usage was approved by
the Mumbai Independent Ethics Committee for
Research on Human Subjects (IECRHS).
As part of the initiative, a vital registration system was
set up to monitor all births, stillbirths, neonatal, infant
and under-five deaths. Deaths of females in the age
group 10-50 years were also recorded. The study was
headed by a project coordinator (NSM) and data collec-
tion activities were managed by two project officers (UB
and SD), each responsible for three municipal wards.
Vital events were identified by 99 locally resident
women, each covering an average 600 households.
Remuneration was based on verified events. Births and
deaths were communicated to one of 12 interviewers,
each responsible for 4 clusters, who confirmed them by
home visits and revisited for a postnatal interview at
about six weeks after delivery. Interviewers had had
higher secondary schooling, were trained for two weeks
and met for feedback and ongoing training weekly. The
interview - developed over multiple pilot iterations -
was based on a predominantly closed questionnaire with
questions on demography, socioeconomic factors, and
maternity care.
Respondents gave verbal consent to interview and
were assured of data confidentiality. Team members
who encountered illness in mothers or infants had an
ethical responsibility to recommend that they visit a
health facility. Each completed interview was checked by
the interviewer and by a supervisor. Supervisors visited
homes to crosscheck every tenth interview, and
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observed interviews randomly. Every third completed
questionnaire was checked by a project officer, who met
with supervisors weekly to review progress. Question-
naires were all crosschecked at a central office and
entered in a database in Microsoft Access with valida-
tion constraints and enforced referential integrity. The
data management officer checked electronic data from
every tenth questionnaire, and compared every fifteenth
questionnaire entered against its original. Information
provided by participants remained confidential, with
access restricted to interviewers, supervisors, data audi-
tors, officers, and analysts. Analyses and outputs were
anonymized.
For three months from January to March 2007, we
added to the basic data collection a questionnaire on
maternal and newborn health care expenditure. All
women who gave birth and received the standard interview
completed this adjunct questionnaire. Recruitment was
sequential until 200 questionnaires had been completed in
each of six municipal wards. To account for the different
recall heuristics that respondents might use in answering
questions on expenditure, we provided two options:
answers on the costs of individual items and answers on
the total costs under each heading. For example, respon-
dents who gave birth at home would more easily be able
to recall expenditure on each item that they needed,
including any fee levied by a traditional birth attendant.
Alternatively, respondents who gave birth in hospital were
usually presented with an aggregate bill for services.
The analysis was limited to households in which at
least one of the members experienced a health event.
This limitation increased confidence that observed dif-
ferences in OOP payments are a reflection of the health
system rather than differences in health status. Among
others, Fabricant, Kamara and Mills [35], Roy and
Howard [36], and Chaudhuri and Roy [38] applied this
method.
Data Analysis
Data analysis was performed using Stata, version 10. An
asset-based index of socio-economic status was con-
structed using principal components analysis (PCA), a
multivariate statistical technique used to describe SES
differentiation within a population (for technical details
on how the PCA was generated, see Vyas and Kumara-
nyake [39]). The procedure followed to construct the
SES index can be summarised in three main steps: selec-
tion of the asset variables; application of PCA; and clas-
sification of households into socio-economic groups.
When measuring SES, previous studies used variables
such as literacy or education level, living in rented or
owner-occupied housing, asset ownership, and dwelling
and sanitation characteristics [40,41]. We carried out
correlation analysis that allowed us to select the
following determinants of wealth in this setting: mater-
nal literacy, husband’s education, electricity source,
water source, house ownership, construction material of
the home, type of toilet facility, holding a ration card,
and ownership of the following assets: a pressure coo-
ker, gas cylinder, chair, cot, table clock, radio, telephone,
fridge or TV. The index was then constructed from the
first component of the PCA to maximize scale reliability
(0.81) and minimize skewness (-0.22) [39,42]. Each
household in the dataset was assigned a wealth score or
SES index value and, on the basis of that score, was allo-
cated to a wealth quintile.
The progressiveness of health expenditure was mea-
sured by comparing average spending in the lowest and
highest quintiles and testing for significant differences in
the means using a t-test1. Significance was attributed at
a 95% confidence level. If there was no significant differ-
ence in spending - if the lowest quintile did not spend
significantly more - expenditure was defined as weakly
regressive. If the lowest quintile spent more than the
highest on any item, spending was defined as strongly
regressive. This conservative measure of regressive
spending was based on the assumption that individuals
in the lowest quintile earned significantly less, and if
they spent the same as (or more than) an individual in
the highest quintile their expenditure would constitute a
greater proportion of their income and would thus be
regressive.
The equity of health spending was then further ana-
lysed using a Kakwani Index [43]. The Kakwani Index is
one of the most widely used measures of equity in
health care payments [44-46]. It is defined as twice the
area between a payments’ concentration curve and the
Lorenz curve and is calculated as;
πk = C− G, (1)
Where:
C = the health payments’ concentration index
G = the Gini coefficient of the SES score (our proxy of
ability to pay).
While the Gini coefficient does not vary (G is constant
in the calculation of the Kakwani index), we calculated
different concentration indices (C) for all the categories
of payments collected in the study (total, direct, indirect,
public, private, etc). The value of πk ranges from -2 to
1. A negative number indicates regressive spending as
the concentration curve lies inside the Lorenz curve,
while a positive number indicates progressive spending
as the concentration curve lies outside the Lorenz curve.
In the case of proportionality, the index is zero (i.e. the
concentration lies on the top of the Lorenz curve).
While the analysis of equity described above could be
calculated using the SES index as a proxy of ability to
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pay, calculating catastrophic health spending required a
measure of total income or expenditure. Household,
rather than individual or extra-household, income/
expenditure is the common measure of the financial
resources available for health seeking [28,33,47]. As
neither household income nor expenditure were col-
lected within this study, we used national data [48] to
impute per capita expenditure by housing type [23]. To
this end, we used Monthly Per-capita Consumer Expen-
diture (MPCE) as published in the Indian National Sam-
ple Survey (2005-2006) [48], which provides per-capita
expenditure by different categories. We chose the classi-
fication of ‘per-capita expenditure by dwelling type’
(pucca, semi-pucca, katcha) because this information
perfectly matched the information on dwelling charac-
teristics in our dataset, and because it provided an
acceptable proxy of wealth2. We then multiplied
monthly per-capita expenditure by twelve to obtain
annual per-capita expenditure. We followed the example
of Flores et al [23] and reported catastrophic spending
both before and after adjusting for coping, by reporting
total expenditure as a percentage of total income and
then reducing total spending by the amount financed
through coping and calculating the reduced expenditure
as a proportion of what income would have been if
medical expenditure had been zero [23,49]. Expenditure
was adjusted for coping using the following formula as
applied in Flores et al [23]:
Pi =
δi − ϑi
xi − ϑi (2)
Where:
Pi = the ‘coping’-adjusted health expenditure ratio
δi = maternity care expenditure
xi = total per-capita expenditure
ϑi = amount of maternity care exp. financed with cop-
ing strategies
Results and Discussion
Health expenditure
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for total expen-
diture on all maternity care as well as antenatal, deliv-
ery, postnatal and neonatal care. The large standard
deviations should be noted as they indicate a significant
level of dispersion in the data, which is the reason why
median expenditure is also presented. Indian Rupees
were converted to US Dollars using an inflation-adjusted
nominal market-based 2010 exchange rate (USD 1 =
0.031002446 Rupee). Values are rounded to the nearest
dollar. All the figures include direct and indirect expen-
diture. Spending on delivery care was the largest contri-
butor to total spending.
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for direct
expenditure as a proportion of total expenditure on all
care as well as antenatal, delivery, postnatal and neona-
tal care. Total indirect expenditure as a proportion of
total expenditure is the inverse of the figures presented.
Indirect expenditure includes spending on transport,
subsistence, loss of earnings for self and companion and
tips to staff, which constituted respectively an average
35%, 25%, 23% and 17% of total indirect expenditure.
Direct spending constituted the larger proportion of
total expenditure.
In summary, delivery expenditure represented the lar-
gest proportion of maternal spending, 51% of total
expenditure. The figure for delivery expenditure pre-
sented in Table 1 is an average of the cost of an institu-
tional delivery and a home delivery. The average
delivery cost for institutional births was $156 (SD. $197)
and for home deliveries a significantly lower $30 (SD
$32). Although direct spending was the largest contribu-
tor to all costs, indirect spending constituted 19% of
total costs, rising to 26% for delivery costs. Indirect
spending was thus a significant contributor to the cost
of maternity care, suggesting that the removal of user
fees alone will not remove the burden of maternity
spending on the poor.
Relative differences in expenditure
The aim of this section is to explore the relative impact
of health spending on the poor. Of particular interest is
whether the burden of spending was regressive. The
progressiveness of spending is established by comparing
spending between the first and fifth wealth quintiles. As
this is a sample of slum dwellers it should be noted that
the fifth quintile refers to the least poor and the first
Table 1 Total expenditures for antenatal, delivery, postnatal and neonatal care (in 2010 USD, inflation adjusted)
Total Expenditure Total ANC Expenditure Total Delivery Care Expenditure Total PNC Expenditure Total NNC Expenditure
N 1204 1204 1204 1204 1204
Mean 271 74 138 26 33
Std Dev. 387 96 188 77 265
Median 174 50 68 10 4
Min 0 0 0 0 0
Max 6478 1625 1563 1602 6293
SD: Standard deviation.
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quintile to the most poor. The wealthy are not repre-
sented in this sample. Total indirect and total direct
spending are analysed in turn. Spending in the private
versus public sectors and home deliveries are then com-
pared because of the pluralistic nature of the health
setting.
Total health expenditure was significantly higher in
the highest quintile and we therefore cannot conclude
that it was regressive based on this measure. However,
total indirect expenditure was weakly regressive by this
measure since there was no significant difference
between spending in the lowest and highest quintiles.
Although the highest wealth quintile spent significantly
more on transport and tips, individuals in the lowest
quintile experienced a significantly higher loss of
income. Loss of income was therefore strongly regres-
sive and spending in this category drove the weakly
regressive burden of indirect health spending as a
whole. The lowest quintile also spent significantly more
indirectly as a proportion of total health expenditure.
The importance of loss of income suggests potential
policy solutions discussed later in the paper. These
results are illustrated in Figures 1 and 2, where they are
also disaggregated by sector.
Comparing spending between the public and private
sectors, direct spending in the public sector was weakly
regressive and indirect spending strongly regressive. Dis-
aggregating indirect expenditures in the public sector,
we found that tips, transport and food/subsistence were
weakly regressive, while loss of income was again
strongly regressive. By comparison, indirect spending in
the private sector was weakly regressive while direct
spending was higher in the highest quintile. We cannot
conclude that private tips were regressive, although
spending on transport and subsistence were weakly
regressive when consulting a private provider. The loss
of income was weakly rather than strongly regressive in
this sector, perhaps reflecting shorter waiting times.
Finally, home deliveries were more likely in the lower
quintiles, suggesting that they were an inferior good, i.e.
as income increased less of the good was demanded.
Similarly, public services were used more by lower
quintiles, again suggesting that they were an inferior
good. Demand for institutional deliveries and private
services increased with wealth and as such were normal
goods. The equity of health spending was also analysed
using the Kakwani Index. Table 3 shows this index
across the full range of expenditure categories analysed
in this paper. As explained before, a negative sign and a
significant p-value indicate regressive spending, while a
positive sign indicates progressive spending.
We find that total indirect expenditure was signifi-
cantly regressive, as were all categories of indirect
spending. Indirect antenatal expenditure was similarly
regressive. Direct delivery expenditure was significantly
progressive, while indirect delivery expenditure was
regressive. Indirect spending on neonatal care was sig-
nificantly regressive, as was all delivery care spending in
the public sector (total, direct and indirect). Total and
direct spending on delivery care in the private sector
was progressive.
Financing health expenditure
In this section we analysed the source of finance for
maternal and neonatal health expenditures, comparing
only the highest and lowest wealth quintiles. As Table 4
illustrates, most maternal and neonatal expenditure was
financed with savings (57.46%), current income from
wage and salary (39.14%) and borrowing (17.41%).
As shown in Table 5, women in the lowest quintile
financed a significantly greater proportion of their total
expenditure through wages. Flores et al [23] describe
spending from wages as contributing primarily to transi-
ent rather than chronic poverty, whether or not spend-
ing levels are categorised as catastrophic. However, our
finding in the previous section, that women in the low-
est quintile had the greatest loss of wage income while
seeking care, suggests that health spending placed a
double burden on the poorest. In addition, we found
that women in the lowest quintile funded significantly
more spending from borrowing, a risk factor for chronic
poverty [23]. Women in the highest quintile financed a
greater proportion of their spending from savings, sug-
gesting that they were better able to plan for these
Table 2 Direct expenditure as proportion of total expenditures
Direct expenditures as a proportion of:
Total expenditure Antenatal care Delivery care Postnatal care Neonatal care
N 1203 1151 1197 788 736
Mean 81% 81% 74% 87% 87%
SD 16% 21% 27% 23% 26%
Median 86% 88% 83% 100% 100%
Min 6% 0 0 0 0
Max 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
SD: Standard deviation.
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expenditures and to absorb health spending without
necessarily contracting other consumption.
Catastrophic health spending in the study population
Since household income or expenditure was not col-
lected in the study, we used national data [48] to impute
expenditure by housing type [23]. As discussed earlier,
health spending is commonly considered catastrophic if
it exceeds 40% of total income/expenditure [50]. Using
this definition, 41% of respondents spent catastrophically
on maternal and neonatal care. A significantly higher
proportion of catastrophic spending occurred in the
highest quintile, possibly because women in the lowest
quintile were forced to control spending by opting for
inferior services (such as public providers and home
deliveries) or by foregoing care altogether, a phenom-
enon also observed in other studies from this context
and discussed further later [18,19]. We followed the
example of Flores et al and adjusted for coping strate-
gies [23]. After adjustment, 15% of the sample experi-
enced catastrophic spending on maternal and neonatal
health. There was no significant difference in the inci-
dence of catastrophic spending across wealth quintiles.
This result highlights that women in the highest quintile
could afford to spend more, not only because they were
less poor, but also because they had more access to cop-
ing strategies in the form of savings (Figure 3).
Conclusion
We analyzed expenditure on maternal and neonatal care
in urban slum communities in Mumbai. The first objec-
tive was to describe the constituent parts of maternal
spending. We found that the cost of delivery care was
the greatest maternal expense and that the cost of
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delivering in a facility was, on average, more than five
times the cost of delivering at home. Formal and infor-
mal payments for delivery care constituted 90% and 10%
of total delivery care expenditure, respectively. We also
found that, while direct costs comprised the greatest
share of maternal spending - indirect costs constituted a
sizeable 19% of total maternal spending on average.
Our next objective was to understand the equity of
maternal spending by measuring how spending varied
by socioeconomic status (SES). We found that indirect
spending was regressive for all types of care, in all sec-
tors. Public services and home deliveries were inferior
goods used by poorer families and as such, all spending
in the public sector was regressive. As demand for the
private sector increased with SES, total and direct
spending on private maternal care had a positive Kak-
wani Index i.e. was progressive. Within indirect costs,
those in the higher SES quintiles spent more on trans-
port and tips while the poorest spent more on lost wage
income. The poorest also faced a significantly higher
proportion of informal payments. These findings,
together with the observation that women in the lowest
quintile funded significantly more spending from bor-
rowing, highlighted how those in the lower quintiles are
most at risk of both transient and chronic poverty [23].
The final objective was to analyze catastrophic spend-
ing and the sources of finance (coping strategies) used
to fund maternal health expenditure. Most maternal and
neonatal expenditure was financed with savings
(57.46%), current income from wage and salary (39.14%)
and borrowing (17.41%). There were, however, signifi-
cant differences in coping strategies across the wealth
quintiles, with the poorest relying more on wages and
borrowing to finance spending and the least poor
0
50
100
150
200
250
Total Direct Indirect
Ex
pe
nd
it
ur
e 
in
 2
01
0 
U
S$
(in
fla
ti
on
 a
dj
us
te
d)
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
Diff. Test 1st-5th
P-value = 0.413
Diff. Test 1st-5th
P-value = 0.000
Diff. Test 1st-5th
P-value = 0.000
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
Transport Food Income loss Tips
Ex
pe
nd
it
ur
e 
in
 2
01
0 
U
S$
(in
fla
ti
on
 a
dj
us
te
d)
 
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
Diff. Test 1st-5th
P-value = 0.159
Diff. Test 1st-5th
P-value = 0.001
Diff. Test 1st-5th
P-value = 0.453
Diff. Test 1st-5th
P-value = 0.583
Figure 2 Spending by wealth quintile in the private sector.
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spending relatively more out of savings. Before adjusting
for coping strategies, 41% of our sample spent catastro-
phically on maternal and neonatal care. A significantly
higher proportion of catastrophic spending occurred
among women in the highest quintile. This could be
because women in the lowest quintile were forced to
control spending by opting for cheaper inferior services
(public sector care and home deliveries), less frequent
consultations, or foregoing care altogether. Conversely,
women in higher wealth groups - although not earning
very much more given the nature of the sample - were
more likely to use higher-cost private services. These
results suggest that women in the highest quintile could
afford to spend more, not only because they were less
poor, but also because they had more access to savings.
The findings reflect behaviour observed in at least two
other studies conducted in Mumbai [18,19]. In short,
poorer people have no safety net and lack flexibility and
confidence in future income. The other issue highlighted
by Shah More [18] is one of ‘culture’. They found that
urban communities are aspirational, and that one of the
aspirations is to achieve ‘modernity’ in health care.
Depending on socioeconomic status, maternity care
steps up through a sequence from home delivery, via
public sector antenatal care, to public sector delivery, to
private sector delivery (the highest aspiration). Identifi-
cation with a higher socioeconomic stratum is also
aspirational and may lead to uptake of health care ser-
vices that proves more catastrophic than anticipated
[18].
As with most analyses of this kind, the study has a
number of limitations. The extent to which the findings
can be generalised to greater Mumbai or to slum-
dwellers in other cities, would depend on how compar-
able is the supply of maternal health services among
other factors. The study also has little to say about the
quality of care received and whether services perceived
to be inferior were in fact of lower quality. Finally we
should be circumspect about the results of the cata-
strophic spending analysis as the data on household
income were imputed from a national dataset and not
collected within the primary survey. That said, the inci-
dence of catastrophic spending in this setting was so
high that even quite large changes in the exact measure
would not change the fact that a significant percentage
of households were being impoverished by maternal
health spending. After adjusting for coping, 15% of our
sample experienced catastrophic spending. There was
no significant difference in the incidence of catastrophic
spending across quintiles after adjusting for coping. A
final limitation of the study is that respondents, in the
case of direct spending only, were allowed the option of
Table 3 Kakwani Index by type of out of pocket
expenditure
Kakwani Index St. Err. P-Value
Total Expenditure 0.013 0.024 0.594
Direct Expenditure 0.037 0.027 0.161
Indirect Expenditure -0.152 0.020 0.000
Transport -0.126 0.025 0.000
Food -0.220 0.034 0.000
Income loss -0.418 0.090 0.000
Tips -0.090 0.025 0.000
Total Antenatal Exp. -0.042 0.022 0.052
Direct Antenatal Exp. -0.021 0.024 0.385
Indirect Antenatal Exp. -0.156 0.030 0.000
Total Delivery Exp. 0.024 0.022 0.290
Direct Delivery Exp. 0.052 0.025 0.041
Indirect Delivery Exp. -0.151 0.026 0.000
Total PNC Exp. -0.048 0.050 0.333
Direct PNC Exp. -0.046 0.053 0.388
Indirect PNC Exp. -0.072 0.050 0.150
Total NNC Exp. 0.139 0.139 0.316
Direct NNC Exp. 0.167 0.148 0.260
Indirect NNC Exp. -0.217 0.092 0.019
Total Public Exp. (delivery care) -0.214 0.033 0.000
Direct Public Exp. (delivery care) -0.185 0.043 0.000
Indirect Public Exp. (delivery care) -0.284 0.038 0.000
Total Private Exp. (delivery care) 0.068 0.034 0.047
Direct Private Exp. (delivery care) 0.079 0.036 0.027
Indirect Private Exp. (delivery care) -0.069 0.047 0.140
Table 4 Proportion financing maternity expenditures by different sources
Variable Proportion 95% confidence interval
Wage, salary 39.14% [37.73%, 40.54%]
Cut food expenditures 0.17% [0.05%, 0.28%]
Mortgage of jewelry, land, livestock 1.74% [1.36%, 2.12%]
Borrowing 17.41% [16.32%, 18.51%]
Sale of assets 0.17% [0.05%, 0.28%]
Savings 57.46% [56.04%, 58.89%]
Cut expenditure on education or health care 0.33% [0.17%, 0.50%]
Other sources 0.66% [0.43%, 0.90%]
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reporting total rather than disaggregated spending.
These responses may be vulnerable to a downward bias
[51-53].
These results highlight the significant problem of
inequitable and catastrophic health spending in this
urban population. However, they also suggest some
potential policy solutions. Given high, and highly
regressive, indirect spending on care, the removal of
user fees alone is unlikely to relieve the burden on the
poorest. Cash transfers (conditional or unconditional)
such as the Janani Suraksha Yojana (JSY) scheme
launched by the Government of India may be effective
in urban Mumbai if it is possible to better target
poorer mothers [54]. This may go some way towards
reducing the negative effects of OOP spending among
slum dwellers and may compensate partially for the
loss of earnings amongst the poorest. In addition, bet-
ter regulation of informal payments, with the aim of
their prevention or removal, would further reduce the
burden on the poorest. For the small number in formal
employment, requiring employers to allow pregnant
employees to attend maternal care services without
loss of earnings should reduce the double burden on
that group. Given that the poorest are more likely to
deliver at home or to use public care, policy makers
should also ensure that these care options provide an
acceptable level of care for mothers and their neonates.
Other strategies to reduce loss of earnings and the
‘double hit’ on wages experienced by the most poor
would further improve the equity of, and access to,
maternal and neonatal care in urban Mumbai. Without
changes such as these, the poorest will continue to
forego higher-cost institutional deliveries, placing
themselves and their neonates at risk.
Endnotes
1. We used the Stata command “ttest” applying the “by
(groupvar)” option that specifies the variable that defines
the two groups that ttest will use to test the hypothesis
that their means are equal. In our study, the two groups
are the lowest and the highest quintiles.
2. Data on Monthly Per-capita Consumption Expendi-
ture (MPCE) by dwelling type is taken from Table 11U
in the Appendix A of 48. National Sample Survey Orga-
nisation: Household Consumer Expenditure in India
2005-2006. In., vol. 523: NSSO; 2006. The average
MPCE is 686 Rs, 822 Rs, 1431 Rs for individuals living
respectively in Katcha, Semi-pucca and Pucca.
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Table 5 Source of finance by wealth quintile
Source of finance (% of total
expenditure)
Wealth Quintile P-value for mean difference test between lowest and
highest quintiles
Lowest 2nd 3rd 4th Highest
Wage and salary 32 31 35 32 25 0.062
Savings 48 47 53 54 60 0.005
Borrowing 18 19 9 12 13 0.074
Other sources 1 3 2 3 2 0.349
Figure 3 Catastrophic spending by wealth quintile.
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